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ABSTRACT
In this article I describe a research agenda for securing machine learning models
against adversarial inputs at test time. This article does not present results but
instead shares some of my thoughts about where I think that the field needs to
go. Modern machine learning works very well on I.I.D. data: data for which
each example is drawn independently and for which the distribution generating
each example is identical. When these assumptions are relaxed, modern machine
learning can perform very poorly. When machine learning is used in contexts
where security is a concern, it is desirable to design models that perform well
even when the input is designed by a malicious adversary. So far most research in
this direction has focused on an adversary who violates the identical assumption,
and imposes some kind of restricted worst-case distribution shift. I argue that
machine learning security researchers should also address the problem of relaxing
the independence assumption and that current strategies designed for robustness
to distribution shift will not do so. I recommend dynamic models that change
each time they are run as a potential solution path to this problem, and show an
example of a simple attack using correlated data that can be mitigated by a simple
dynamic defense. This is not intended as a real-world security measure, but as
a recommendation to explore this research direction and develop more realistic
defenses.
NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
x A train or test example or a sample from the model
y The true label for an example
θ The parameter vector of the model
mtrain Number of training examples
mtest Number of test examples
k The number of classes
r The error rate of the classifier on the naturally occurring test set
r˜ The error rate under the test set attack
pmodel(x; θ) The probability distribution over output classes learned by the model
x˜ An adversarial example
f(x,η) A transformation of x controlled transformation parameters η.
S The set of allowable values of η
L(x, y) The loss incurred by the model while classifying input x with label y.
ǫ The constraint on adversarial perturbation size
1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning is now a working technology and produces predictions that are correct most of the
time for many different tasks (Taigman et al., 2014; He et al., 2015; Wu et al., 2016; Amodei et al.,
2016). In general, these tasks use “naturally occurring” data as opposed to data produced by an
∗
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adversary who intentionally tries to fool the model. When an adversary tries to fool the model, the
adversary generally succeeds (see Carlini et al. (2019) for a recent evaluation guidelines explaining
how to implement attacks that almost always suceed). The adversary can not only cause the model
to make an incorrect prediction (an untargeted attack, e.g. fail to recognize that a photo of a dog is
dog) but can also cause the model to make a specific mistake (a targeted attack, e.g. cause the model
to think the photo of a dog is specifically an airplane, or some other class chosen by the attacker in
advance).
In general, the reason that machine learning performs so much worse under attack is that modern
machine learning mostly relies on the i.i.d. assumptions. We can think of most machine learning
algorithms as using a training set to learn the model with the goal of maximizing performance on
a test set of examples. Under the i.i.d. assumptions, the train and test examples are all generated
independently from an identical distribution. That is, each example is drawn independently from
some distribution pdata that remains the same throughout the entire train and test generation process.
When a machine learning system is used in a setting where security is a concern, the i.i.d. assump-
tions are usually no longer valid. In this article I will focus on test-time attacks against the input of
the model. In this setting, the attacker supplies some or all of the test examples. The attacker can
draw test samples from a new distribution padv rather than from pdata. This makes the challenge
for the model much greater: instead of statistically generalizing from training examples to new ex-
amples from the same distribution, the model must also generalize to a different distribution. In
most work on adversarial examples so far, the test examples are still generated indepedently from
one another, and padv remains similar to pdata, in the sense that a sample from padv is generated by
generating a sample from pdata and then modifying it slightly. In this article, I argue that machine
learning security researchers should additionally study the setting where test set examples are not
independent. One attack strategy in this setting is to use early examples sampled randomly from
some simple distribution (such as pdata) until a mistake is found, and then late examples are all
copies of a known mistaken point. For modern models, these attacks can drive the error rate after
the first mistake is found to 100%.
Modern machine learning models typically have two distinct phases of existence: first, they go
through a training stage, in which the parameters are adapted to fit then training set, then the param-
eters are frozen and the model is deployed to the test / production / inference / serving stage where
the same parameters are used to make predictions on new data indefinitely. This split between the
training stage and inference stage has been useful because training updates are not very reliable and
can often ruin the model. Currently it is possible to rigorously evaluate a model and determine that
its predictions are reliable, then deploy the model to run in inference mode, but it is not yet feasible
to verify ahead of time that a particular training algorithm will produce reliable updates indefinitely.
Unfortunately, I believe that this separation of dynamic training and static inference must end in
order to defend against correlated test-time attacks. To avoid the attacker, I believe that the model
must become a moving target that continually changes, even after it has been deployed.
2 ATTACKS THAT VIOLATE THE identical ASSUMPTION
Most adversarial examples attacks so far work by violating the identical assumption. Models are
designed assuming that all the test data is drawn from pdata (i.e., all the train and test data is drawn
from an identical distribution) but instead the adversary supplies examples sampled from padv. On
top of this, most work on adversarial examples constrains padv to be highly similar to pdata, in
the sense that samples v˜ from padv are generated by slightly modifying samples x from pdata. A
common attack strategy is to modify a sample x from pdata by replacing it with f(x,η), where f is
some transformation of x that preserves semantics when η is constrained to some set S of allowable
values. A common choice is f(x,η) = x+η for ‖η‖∞ < ǫ for some small value of ǫ. Within these
similarity constraints, adversarial examples are often chosen to maximize the loss L(x, y) incurred
by the model. The generation process is thus:
x, y ∼ pdata
x˜ = max
η∈S
L(f(x,η), y).
The maximization operation is generally approximated with some kind of reasonably cheap
optimization algorithm and is often stochastic (Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Kurakin et al., 2016;
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Warde-Farley & Goodfellow, 2016; Madry et al., 2017). Altogether this generation process implic-
itly defines a distribution padv.
Defenses against adversarial examples are often evaluated in terms of their error rate across an
adversarially perturbed version of the naturally occurring test set. This metric was introduced by
(Goodfellow et al., 2014b) and is still recommended, e.g. by Carlini et al. (2019). This metric mea-
sures expected error in terms of starting points sampled independently from pdata and worst case
error in terms of the η transformation parameters applied at each starting point. The metric is thus
not truly worst case, because the choice of starting point is treated as random and naturally occuring
rather than adversarial.
3 ATTACKS THAT VIOLATE THE independent ASSUMPTION
In threat models where the attacker could realistically choose the “starting point,” the true worst case
metric.
This setting has previously been described by a research agenda talk (Goodfellow, 2018), a re-
view paper (Gilmer et al., 2018), and is the basis for a contest (Brown et al., 2018). Compared to
Goodfellow (2018), this article focuses much more on the problem of non-independent test time in-
puts. Gilmer et al. (2018) (Sec 4.8) describe correlated input attacks but do not advocate researching
defenses against them but instead advocate reducing the error rate on naturally occurring test sets
or reducing the total volume of errors made by the model. This article argues that such approaches
do not provide a defense against a correlated input attacker and that defense mechanisms other than
reduced error rate are necessary. Brown et al. (2018) introduce a contest whose eventual winner
will most likely need to develop defenses against correlated input attacks, but the report introducing
the contest does not include suggestions for possible solutions. This article focuses primarily on
speculation about future directions that may lead to a solution.
4 THREAT MODELING: WHEN CAN AN ATTACKER CORRELATE TEST TIME
INPUTS?
Security research should generally include a threat model: what are the attackers goals and capabil-
ities? In this case, we should consider which kinds of attackers are capable of mounting a test time
input attack.
At the same time, much of the point of machine learning research is that machine learning has the
potential to be fairly general, and applied to many application areas. In this article, I don’t attempt
to exhaustively threat model all application areas, but just give some brief examples to show how
generic machine learning principles interact with threat modeling in specific application areas.
Consider one potential attack vector: evading facial recognition by wearing glasses with patterns
on the frames designed to fool the face recognition system (Sharif et al., 2016). Suppose that when
a person physically approaches the entrance to the facility, a guard photographs them and the face
recognition system returns an estimate of that person’s specific identity. Suppose the attacker wishes
to gain access to a secure facility controlled by a whitelist of people who have access.
In this scenario, we may conclude that it is very easy or very difficult for an attacker to mount
a correlated input attack depending on a few different factors. First, if we believe that the attacker
must probe the system for errors by physically arriving at the facility and attempting to enter wearing
different glasses, it seems difficult to mount a correlated input attack. The attacker may be arrested
by the guard if the face recognition system correctly rejects them as not belonging to the whitelist.
An attacker who arrives repeatedly wearing different glasses each time may be even more likely
to be arrested. This means that there is little opportunity to probe the system for errors and also a
high cost to mounting failed attacks. Under such a scenario, we may actually be interested in the
error rate on adversarial modifications of naturally occurring data (i.e., we may be interested in the
percentage of people who can appear to be on the whitelist by wearing adversarial glasses). If this
error rate is low, attackers will be discouraged from mounting exploratory attacks. If, on the other
hand, we believe that it is easy to transfer adversarial examples from other models, then attackers
may be able to build their own model or ensemble of models (Szegedy et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2016),
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and find a person for whom some set of glasses will reliably get them into the facility. Or, if the
face recognition system used by the facility is commercially available, the attackers could buy their
own copy, test it for vulnerabilities offline, and then mount a live attack after finding a reliable
vulnerability. In either of these cases, the attacker now has a high ability to mount a correlated input
attack. However, we may still find some use in studying the error rate on adversarial modifications
of naturally sampled data. This error rate is essentially the percentasge of the general population
who can be used to mount a reliable attack, given the correct glasses. If the error rate of the system
is small enough, it may be difficult for the attacking organization to find and recruit an individual
who has both the right face and the skills to carry out the adversarial mission. This is overall merely
a mitigating factor and not a complete defense though. We have seen that in this example, the ability
of the attacker to perform offline screening determines whether defenses that reduce the error rate
on adversarial perturbations of naturally occurring data are of some limited uses (when the attacker
can perform screening) or are of relatively high value as a deterrent (when the attacker must perform
exploratory attacks live, and faces a high risk of arrest if the error rate is low).
As another example, consider a detector of synthetic media (“DeepFakes” as discussed by
(Chesney & Citron, 2018)). A game theoretic analysis of the fake-vs-fake detectors competition
(Goodfellow et al., 2014a) suggests that, given enough computation and enough data, the Nash equi-
librium is for the fakes to come from the same distribution as real data, forcing the fake detector to
perform no better than chance. This problem can be avoided in the short term while the fakes and
fake detectors are in an “arms race” approaching the Nash equilibrium. The long run is beyond the
scope of this article (fake detectors could perform better if given access to signals other than the
content of the media itself, tools such as cryptographic signing of real media may be more useful
than fake detectors, etc.). As an exercise in threat modeling, consider how to evaluate a short term
fake detector. Even a fake detector that performs well on randomly sampled data (accuracy of 99%
on a collection of real images and a collection of fake images from some generative model) could
perform quite poorly in practice. The attacker only needs to find one fake image that bypasses the
detector, and then this image can be deployed widely. In fact, with the fake detector’s stamp of
approval, the image would be even more credible than if no fake detector existed. In this scenario,
correlated data attacks are much more likely to be feasible because the attacker can upload multiple
candidate fake images from multiple anonymous accounts and observe which are flagged as fake
with impunity. Moreover, it is not particularly important for the attacker to be able to choose exactly
which image results in a mistake. If the motive of the attacker is to cause political damage to a partic-
ular political cause, the set of images damaging to that cause is often quite large. It is very different
from the previous face recognition example, where it must be possible to cause a mistake using the
face of one of the infiltrators as the starting point for the attack. In this hypothetical scenario, it is
particularly important to build models that are robust to correlated data attacks.
5 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT DEFENSES
Most current defenses are intended to mitigate problems caused by adversarial distribution shift, but
not problems caused by adversarial correlation of test-time examples.
Most strategies for mitigating distribution shift can still be highly exploited by an adversary who can
impose correlation of test time examples.
One popular family of strategies for mitigating distribution shift is adversarial training
(Szegedy et al., 2013; Goodfellow et al., 2014b; Madry et al., 2017). Current state of the art ad-
versarially trained models are all still deterministic, so if they have non-zero error rate on naturally
occurring data, an attacker can find a single mistake and then repeat it in order to obtain essentially
a 100% attack success on correlated attack data. While adversarial training has thus been state of
the art on many expectimax research benchmarks (expectation over I.I.D. test examples, max over
error induced by adversarial perturbations), it is not useful for resisting true worst case attacks that
occur in practice. A similar criticism applies to all other current defense techniques designed to
find a fixed decision boundary that reduces an expectimax metric, including certified defenses (e.g.
Wong & Kolter (2017); Raghunathan et al. (2018); Dvijotham et al. (2018); Cohen et al. (2019)).
This is not to criticize adversarial training or certified defenses against perturbations, because they
are useful for making algorithms that perform well despite a change in the data-generating distribu-
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tion. The eventual solution will need to address both changes in the data-generating distribution and
relaxation of the assumption that test-time examples are generated independently.
6 HELLO WORLD EXAMPLE
As a brief example, let’s walk through a few hypothetical attacks that use correlated data, and a
few hypothetical defenses. All of the attacks will be variations of the “test set attack” described
by Gilmer et al. (2018). The defenses will be variations on three themes—improved supervised
learning performance, generic classifiers using a fixed distribution, and test set memorization. All
of these are “hello world” examples of very weak attacks and very weak defenses. My intention
in writing this article is to encourage others to develop better defenses in this space (and insofar as
better attacks are necessary to study better defenses, also to develop better attacks).
The test set attack basically consists of presenting examples from the test set i.i.d. to the classifier
until the classifier makes a mistake. That mistake is then repeated indefinitely. There are obviously
many ways to formalize this in practice, allowing us to pay attention to factors like rate-limiting
access to the classifier, the classifier accepting batches of data vs individual examples, how the
classifier performs on data other than the data provided by a particular adversary, how long the
classifier will stay live before being replaced with a different one, etc. Here I will focus on a few
particularly simple cases.
Suppose that the adversary is given a finite number of opportunities to attack the classifier, and thus
essentially just presents a test set containingmtest examples.
Consider an untargeted attack in which the goal of the adversary is simply to cause misclassification.
If the classifier has error rate r, then the expected number of trials to find a mistake is 1
r
. For the
remaining test examples, the attacker simply repeats this mistake. For example, on CIFAR-10, an
attacker allowed to present the same number of examples as in the CIFAR-10 test set (10,000), when
attacking a classifier with r = .02, would need on average 50 examples to find a mistake, and then
would cause mistakes on the remaining 9950 examples, for a total error rate of 99.51%. This is thus
a fairly strong attack against an undefended model. The attack could be made stronger by using
black box adversarial examples to increase r beyond the rate on naturally occurring data.
How do the defenses fare?
Adversarial training, etc: Existing adversarial robustness approaches such as adversarial training
generally do not reduce r on naturally occurring data, so they do not help at all. In fact, many of
them increase r and would slightly hurt performance.
Better supervised learning: Gilmer et al. (2018) suggest focusing on traditional supervised learning
metrics such as the error rate on naturally occurring data, and also suggest reducing the total volume
of input space that results in an error. Overall the error rate under the test set attack obtained by a
classifier with error rate r on naturally occurring data is
r˜ =
mtest −
1
r
mtest
.
For any r greater than zero, this error rate approaches 1 asmtest approaches infinity. In other words,
if the classifier is deployed for long enough, an attacker can exploit it arbitrarily badly. Or if we
consider a relatively short finite deployment, for our hypothetical CIFAR-10 classifier to achieve an
r˜ of .05, it would need to reach an r of roughly 10−4. On CIFAR-10 I do not know of a good way to
estimate the Bayes error rate, but it seems reasonable to believe that for many tasks the Bayes error
rate is well above 10−4, so for these tasks no deterministic classifier could be reasonably secure.
Stochastic models If a deterministic model performs badly, what about a stochastic model? Stochas-
tic models have been proposed as defenses against perturbation-based expectimax adversarial ex-
amples (Feinman et al., 2017). While the specific defenses proposed so far are known to be mostly
broken in most cases (Carlini & Wagner, 2017) we can still think about how well stochasticity in
general can perform as a defense against the test set attack. Suppose that rather than learning a
deterministic classification function mapping example x to class y, the model uses a fixed classi-
fication distribution, pmodel(y | x). These models are still quite vulnerable. Suppose the attacker
manages to find a point x such that, when sampling class estimates from the model, the model has
5
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error rate rx. Then, asymptotically asmtest approaches infinity, the model under attack using x has
error rate rx. If there exists even a single point where the true class is not argmaxy pmodel(y | x),
then rx > 0.5. Overall, the stochasticity can make the attack more complicated: the attacker should
not just repeat the first x that results in a mistake because the mistake may not be repeatable, the
attacker has to maintain an estimate of rx for each x the attacker has tried, and the attacker faces
an exploration-vs-exploitation tradeoff (if the attacker has found a x with rx > 0.5, should they
repeat it indefinitely, or search for another input with an even higher error rate?). In other words, the
attacker must upgrade from the simplest version of the test set attack to some kind of rate-tracking,
rate-optimizing test set attack. Asymptotically though, the stochastic defense can bring the error rate
down only as low as 50%, unless the baseline r has literally reached 0.
Abstention: suppose that a model refuses to classify some examples, either determinstically, or by
sometimes sampling an “abstain” class from a fixed pmodel(y | x). (Depending on the application /
threat model, it may or may not be feasible to allow the model to abstain) This does not change the
above analysis very much. The model will presumably abstain on many mistakes and thus reduce r,
if we define r to be the rate at which the model makes an incorrect prediction rather than abstaining
or making a correct prediction. However as long as we do not reduce r to literally 0 the above
analysis still applies.
Dynamic modeling: I argue that the problem is using a fixed model pmodel(y | x), regardless of
whether this model is deterministic, makes use of probabilities, or is able to abstain on some inputs.
Instead, I believe that the model must become a moving target that cannot be repeatedly exploited
using the same input. The concept of a moving target defense has precedent in traditional computer
security (?). As a “hello world” example showing that improvements are possible using a dynamic
strategy, consider the memorization defense: the classifier memorizes all previously seen x inputs
and abstains every time a repeated x is presented. The test set attack thus obtains r˜ ≤ r, depend-
ing on whether the attacker runs unique test examples trying to explore for a new vulnerability, or
whether the attacker runs multiple memorized points that are abstained on. Note that the abstention
rate on adversarial inputs approaches 1 asymptotically if the attacker prioritizes exploitation over
exploitation. In many domains, a high abstention rate on adversarial data is acceptable (e.g., a spam
detector that abstains in the presence of an adversary can be acceptable if messages resulting in ab-
stention are treated as spam). The main downside of this approach is that it can have high abstention
rates on non-adversarial data. On i.i.d. test benchmark datasets containing high dimensional data,
the abstention rate will usually be zero, but in real-world applications where many users send the
same query (e.g., one legitimate e-mail is sent to two users, who then each query the server to find
out whether it is spam) the abstention rate of this approach could be significant. The test set attack
and memorization defense could also clearly be extended in an arms race, with the attack being
extended to add noise or other minor variations to avoid the detection of duplicates, and the defense
being extended to reject approximate matches rather than exact matches. The purpose of this article
is not to analyze how that arms race would play out, but just to show that there exists a simple attack
for which there exists a dynamic defense better than all fixed defenses.
Finally, let’s consider what happens with targeted, rather than untargeted attacks. For a targeted
attack, the attacker wishes to hit a specific target class, rather than merely causing any mistake. For
most of the analysis above, this just means we use a different value of r. When calculating r, we
now need to measure the rate at which inputs are misclassified specifically as the attacker’s target
class, not just the rate at which they are misclassified. One rough way to model what happens in
this case is just to divide our earlier value for r by k (the number of classes). In domains where k
is very large (e.g. speech recognition, where k is combinatorially large because the model outputs a
complete sentence containing many words / characters) the test set attack is no longer very effective
even against undefended models. In domains where k is medium (e.g. CIFAR-10, where k is 10, or
ImageNet, where k is 1000) it is still feasible to find targeted attacks within standard benchmark test
sets. The analysis of a stochastic model pmodel(y | x) is also different in the targeted case, because
the existence of a point x that is argmax-classified as the target class does not imply an attack
success rate of 1
2
anymore, but only an attack success rate of 1
k
. Overall, this analysis suggests that
for targeted attacks, our “hello world” test set attack is not nearly as interesting as in the untargeted
setting. Finally, for the memorization defense, one interesting observation is that the model does
not need to be able to abstain in order to reduce the attack success rate. Rather than abstaining
on memorized examples, the model can return a class uniformly at random, reducing the error
rate to 1
k
. The memorization defense without abstention thus reduces r˜ of an arbitrary stochastic
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or deterministic model to match the r˜ of the best possible stochastic model for a fixed argmax-
classification r.
So far the defenses here have been discussed primarily in a black box setting, where the attacker
is able to send inputs and observe outputs, but does not have a full specification of the model.
In the white box setting, the attacker could perform exploratory screening on their own copy of the
model. When mounting the real attack, they could thus obtain the asymptotic error rate immediately,
rather than ramping up to it after an initial exploratory phase. For deterministic or fixed stochastic
models, this asymptotic error rate can be obtained using a single adversarial example. For a dynamic
model using the memorization defense, a white box threat model is enough to break the defense and
obtain worse results than the asymptotic black box setting. During the offline screening phase, if
the attacker is able to find mtest unique mistaken points, then during the online attack phase the
attacker can present each of these points to obtain an error rate of 100%. In the future, I hope that
a more sophisticated dynamic defense might be able to succeeded in a “white fading to black box”
case where the attacker has a full description of the model at some point in time, but the model’s
dynamic updates are unpredictable enough that the attacker rapidly loses knowledge of the model as
the model is updated.
Both the variations on the test set attack presented here and the memorization defense presented here
are intended as “hello world” examples to show that the test set attack, though trivial, can seriously
compromise existing defenses, and that the memorization defense, though impractical for real-world
use, can reach levels of robustness not reachable by a fixed model. I hope that these “hello world”
examples will pave the way for more practical defenses against correlated data attacks in the future.
7 COMBINING DEFENSE STRATEGIES
While I am fairly confident that dynamic model behavior will be a necessary component of an
eventual successful defense strategy, I doubt that dynamic model behavior alone will be sufficient.
I think it is most likely that the performance of a model under attack is something like an “AND”
function: many factors need to be handled correctly for the defense to work, and the performance
under attack will be near zero if any one of those factors is absent. Thus, introducing a single
component, such as dynamic model behavior, may result in no measurable benefit until some other
required synergistic component is introduced.
I speculate that the following may also be important mechanisms to combine with dynamic model
behavior.
7.1 CONFIDENCE THRESHOLDING / ABSTENTION MECHANISMS / DETECTION MECHANISMS
In the “hello world” memorization defense above, I incorporated an abstention mechanism in order
to achieve a good defense in the untargeted setting. This was not necessary in the targeted setting.
I suspect that in many practical settings, abstention will be an important mechanism to include in
dynamic defenses. In the “hello world” defense, the model abstained on memorized examples that
were previously presented. I suspect that other defenses will need to abstain using other criteria.
Suppose that we make a dynamic model that constantly moves its decision boundary, so that attack-
ers cannot predict exactly what it will do. Its decision boundary needs to remain somewhat near the
true decision boundary or it will not perform well on naturally occurring data. For points near the
decision boundary, the dynamic model is thus forced to behave more deterministically. One solu-
tion is to abstain on such points. This is just one example of an abstention criterion different from
the memorization criterion. Other researchers are also exploring abstention mechanisms in other
contexts (Carlini & Wagner, 2017; ?; ?; Brown et al., 2018). In general, I think abstention using a
variety of criteria may be necessary to combine with dynamic modeling.
7.2 ACTIVE LEARNING
Another strong candidate is active learning. When a model detects potentially troubling activity
at test time it could request ground truth labels for some of these examples. One limitation of the
7
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memorization defense is that, while it can detect repeated examples as potentially troubling activity,
it does not have a mechanism for determining the correct way to label them.
7.3 LIMITING ACCESS TO THE MODEL
For many applications, legitimate users do not need to run many queries. Users mounting the test
set attack or similar black box attacks need to run relatively large numbers of queries (e.g. 1
r
for the
test set attack).
Dynamic models that change during their deployment phase may have some limit on how quickly
they can change without compromising performance on naturally occurring data. Limiting access to
the model, for example, rate-limiting the number of queries a user can make, may be an important
mechanism to make sure that attackers cannot find vulnerabilities as quickly as dynamic updates to
the model remove them.
8 CONCLUSION
Based on the above line of reasoning, I believe it is important for more of the machine learning
research community to study defenses against attackers who use correlated attacks at test time, such
as finding a single mistake and repeatedly exploiting it. I do not have a complete solution in mind,
but I believe that any fixed model, even a fixed model that incorporates stochasticity, will always be
a “sitting duck” that can be reliably broken as soon the attacker has found a weak point. Because
of this, I believe it will be necessary to develop dynamic models that change their decision function
continually during deployment. I suspect it will also be necessary to combine such behavior with
other defense mechanisms, such as confidence thresholding, active learning, and limiting access to
the model. I call on the machine learning research community to help make such effective defenses
a reality.
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